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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of unemployment on migration. In a theoretical model, we show
that unemployment, per se, does not a¤ect migration. Rather, migration only occurs when unemployment shocks force residents to update their expectations of the area’s unemployment rate. Once these
expectations change, migration reallocates labor to bring the economy back to equilibrium. To test
this theory, we devise an empirical strategy using state level data in the U.S. from 2000 to 2010, we
…nd strong empirical evidence that unemployment shocks outside of expectations have a far greater
impact on migration than unemployment shocks that are within expectations.
JEL Codes: R23, J61, D8
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Introduction

Labor market theory has long posited that economic factors induce migration across regions; see Lowry
(1966) for an early exposition and Wozniak (2010) and Saks and Wozniak (2011) for an updated treatment.
This migration helps reallocate resources to those regions where it is most valued and away from regions
where it is least valued. One such factor considered to be an important driver of migration is unemployment: people, the theory holds, should immigrate to regions with low unemployment and emigrate from
regions with high unemployment.
This prediction has been tested numerous times in the empirical literature. One common approach
is to regress net migration on a region’s unemployment rate and other covariates, using either state- or
MSA-level data. For all its intuitive appeal, this prediction has not found consistent support in the data.
As Greenwood (1975, 1997) notes, the coe¢ cient on unemployment often has an unexpected sign or is not
statistically signi…cant.
There have been many suggestions why the empirical results do not con…rm the theoretical intuition.
One possible explanation is that, by using aggregate data, the studies were unable to capture the personal
characteristics of interest; see, for example, Navratil and Doyle (1977).

Another explanation is that

simple panel regressions fail to capture the plethora of options available to a potential migrant, including
the possible option of not migrating. This insight inspired a number of studies that employ a conditional
logit model, such as Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001) and Wozniak (2010).
In this paper, we present an alternative explanation.

It is our contention that these unintuitive

results stem from model misspeci…cation. Speci…cally, we show that migration does not respond to the
observed level of unemployment, per se, but rather people migrate due to changes in their expectations
of unemployment across regions.

The previous literature, in failing to account for these expectations,

e¤ectively averaged the e¤ect of unemployment observations that did and did not change expectations.
To formalize this insight, we develop a parsimonious theoretical model of migration.

This model

assumes that a nation is composed of two regions, each of which is subject to an unemployment shock.
The unemployment shock represents the probability that a resident in that region is unemployed. If the
resident is unemployed, then she earns nothing; if she works, the resident earns her marginal product
of labor.

The residents of the nation are endowed with initial probability models that they believe

characterize the regions’shock processes. In this environment, an equilibrium is de…ned as the distribution
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of population across regions such that no resident wants to migrate.

This condition implies that the

expected wages in the two regions must be equal to each other. As we will show, the initial population
distribution depends on the residents’ expectations of one region’s unemployment rate relative to the
other.
Given the initial equilibrium, we then consider two alternative scenarios.

In the …rst scenario, we

assume that each region is hit by an unemployment shock that falls within the residents’ expectations.
As we show, this event has no e¤ect on migration because the residents’ expectations do not change.
In the second scenario, one region is hit with a level of unemployment that is outside of the residents’
expectations. As this state of the world was not believed possible, the residents are forced to update their
expectations about the shock process. This change in expectations then induces residents to migrate until
the expected wages are once again equalized.
Using this theoretical model, we derive three testable predictions. First, the level of unemployment only
a¤ects migration if it alters expectations. If, instead, a shock occurs that does not change expectations,
then migration should not occur.

It is for this reason, we contend, that the previous literature, which

typically ignores expectations, did not …nd a consistent impact of unemployment on migration. Second,
if the shock improves (worsens) the residents’ expectations about region i’s unemployment shock, then
residents immigrate into (emigrate from) region i. Third, unemployment shocks that cause greater changes
in expectations lead to larger migration responses than shocks that cause smaller changes in expectations.
In our empirical section, we test these three predictions on U.S. state-level data from 2000 to 2010. To
do this, we must di¤erentiate between shocks that are within people’s expectations and shocks that are
outside. As these data are not readily available, we have created a simple empirical test that attempts to
distinguish between these two types of observations. An unemployment shock is de…ned as within expectations if it is su¢ ciently close to past observations, where "close" is measured by k standard deviations
from the mean of the past data.
outside of that range.

An unemployment shock is de…ned as outside expectations if it falls

If k is large enough, then the shock can plausibly be considered unexpected, as

that unemployment rate is far away from what has been observed historically.1
Given these de…nitions, we …nd strong evidence that unemployment observations outside of expectations have a much larger impact on migration than shocks within expectations. Further, we show that
unemployment rates that are above expectations induce out-migration, while unemployment rates that are
below expectations induce in-migration, just as the theory predicts. These results are robust to a number
3

of alternative speci…cations. Our …ndings also suggest that unemployment shocks that are further away
from people’s expectations cause a greater impact on migration than shocks that are closer to (but still
outside of) people’s expectations. Finally, we …nd no evidence that a correlation between our expectations
variable and large unemployment changes is creating a spurious result.

2

Theoretical model

A nation is divided into two regions, labeled region A and region B.
continuum of identical residents.

The nation is populated by a

For simplicity, let the size of the continuum of residents be equal to

unity. Call Ri the number of residents living in region i 2 fA; Bg, so that
RA + RB = 1

(1)

These residents are perfectly mobile across region, and migration is costless. This latter assumption could
be relaxed by assuming that migrants have to pay a …xed cost to move, but as this would not change our
results, we do not add in this complexity.
Each region is subject to an exogenous unemployment shock, the only source of randomness in the
model.

This shock represents the probability that a resident living in region i is unemployed.2

If a

resident is unemployed, she earns nothing. This assumption is without loss of generality, as long as the
amount an unemployed person earns is su¢ ciently small.

If a resident is employed, she supplies labor

inelastically and is paid a wage equal to her marginal product of labor.

All employment contracts are

assumed to be one period contracts. The production function in region i is
Yi = a

bLi Li

where a and b are constants and Li is the number of workers employed in region i.
The nation’s residents are endowed with initial probability models that they believe characterize the
regions’unemployment shock processes. The initial probability model for region i, labeled
to have two key characteristics.

i

, is assumed

First, the distribution governing each region’s unemployment shock is

identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.).3

Second, the probability model puts positive weight

only on a …nite number of unemployment values. Let ni represent the number of possible states of the
world that the residents believe are possible in region i.
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The decision problem of each resident is to maximize her expected wage by deciding in which region
to live. The expected wage of a resident in region i is
i

E w

i

=

n
X

i
s

uis (0) + 1

uis

a

2bLis

s=1

= a 1

E ui

2bE

1

ui Li

where uis is region i’s unemployment rate if state s occurs. The residents will continue to migrate until
both regions’ expected wages are equal.

When this condition is satis…ed, no resident has the incentive

to migrate. We de…ne an equilibrium to be the distribution of residents across regions, RA ; RB ; such
that
E wA = E wB

(2)

. To …nd the initial population distribution across regions, combine (2) with (1) and the restriction that,
in any unemployment state s, Lis = 1

uis Ri . Doing this, the initial population distribution for region

i is
Ri

a E uj
h
=
2bE (1

h
i
2
E ui + 2bE 1 uj
i
h
i
2
2
ui ) + 2bE (1 uj )

where j 6= i. Notice that the initial population in region i depends on the residents’expectations of each
region’s unemployment rate.
Given this initial equilibrium, we can now characterize the determinants of net migration, where net
migration is de…ned as the percentage change in a region’s population.
alternative scenarios.

To do so, we consider two

In the …rst scenario, each region is hit by a shock that lies within the residents’

expectations. In the second, one region is hit by a shock that is outside of the residents’ expectations.
For each scenario, we will calculate how migration responds to the observed level of unemployment.
Scenario 1:
Assume that both regions are hit by an unemployment shock that is within the residents’expectations.
That is, the residents believed that the observed unemployment rates were possible, and so their occurrence
gives the residents no new information. As a consequence, there is no need for the residents to update
their expectations. Because the expectations are unchanged, the equilibrium population distribution does
not change. This implies that there is no migration as a result of the unemployment shocks. This result
highlights the model misspeci…cation discussed above: the observed level of unemployment does not a¤ect
migration if the observed unemployment does not a¤ect the residents’expectations.

5

Scenario 2:
Assume that region A is hit by an unemployment shock that is outside of the residents’expectations,
while region B is hit by the same shock as in scenario 1.

As region A’s shock is of an unexpected

magnitude, the nation’s residents are forced to update their expectations. With a new set of expectations,
the equilibrium population in region A is

RA0

f

a E uB
=
fh
2bE (1

h
i
f
2
E uA + 2bE 1 uB
i
h
i
2
2
uA ) + 2bE (1 uB )

where E represents the updated expectation. Given the new population distribution we can calculate net
migration as
M igrationA =

RA0 RA
RA

While the resulting value of net migration depends on how much the unemployment observation changes
people’s expectations, the important point to note is migration occurs in response to the change in people’s
expectations.

3

Empirical model

One central prediction emerges from the theoretical model presented above: only shocks to unemployment
that are outside of expectations should impact migration across regions. In this section, we will test this
prediction using US state-level data from 2000 - 2010.4 We will also investigate two related hypotheses.
We hypothesize that unemployment observations that are above (below) people’s expectations cause people
to emigrate from (immigrate into) the state. Also, we hypothesize that shocks that are further away from
expectations, or unemployment observations that cause larger changes in expectations, should have a
larger impact on migration than observations that are only slightly outside of people’s expectations. As
we will show below, we …nd substantial evidence for each of these predictions in the data.
Evaluating this theory requires an empirical measure of expectations. There are numerous possible
strategies for obtaining this measure. First, we could assume that people, at some early date, were endowed
with an initial expectation of each state’s unemployment, ui;e . This value could then be updated using
some backward-looking process, yielding an expected value of the unemployment rate for each region and
for each period. As an example, if we assume that people had adaptive expectations, they might update

6

their expectations according to the following rule:
i;e
ui;e
t = ut 1 +

for some

.

uit

ui;e
t 1

A similar, and perhaps more common approach would be to endow people with a prior

distribution over a wide support, and then allow Bayes’rule to update the prior. Second, we could look
for direct measures of expectations. Analysts’forecasts of future unemployment rates, used for each state’s
budgeting process, are an example of this type of direct measure.
There are di¢ culties associated with each of these strategies. The …rst approach is problematic because,
except under very speci…c and rare circumstances, all unemployment realizations would alter people’s
expectations. While we don’t reject this as a possibility, this approach doesn’t test our theory, as our model
only updates expectations when the unemployment rate is unexpected. The second approach, obtaining
a direct measure of expectations about future unemployment by month and by state, is problematic, as
data like these are not easily available.
Given these challenges, we take a di¤erent approach, one that is consistent with the theoretical model
presented above. We assume that, at some initial period t0 , people form state-speci…c unemployment
expectations using the history of each state’s unemployment observations. These expectations are ranges
of unemployment rates that the residents believe to be possible in the following period. Speci…cally, each
range is de…ned as the set of unemployment values that lie within
of the unemployment observations in state s from [t0

T; t0 ),

s

s

k

s,

where

s

is the mean value

is the standard deviation of those same

observations, and k is a constant. Note that in this de…nition T represents the number of periods of data
people use to form their initial expectations, and k characterizes the width of the resulting expectations.
Crucially, we assume that any unemployment observation that falls inside the range is within expectations,
while observations that are outside of this range are outside expectations.
With these initial expectations de…ned, we now must discuss how these expectations evolve over time.
To do this, consider an unemployment rate observed in state s at time t0 . This rate could be either inside
or outside the range of initial expectations.

If the unemployment rate is inside the range, then people

expected that this unemployment rate was possible. Because of this, people do not have to update their
expectations since the observed rate of unemployment matched their prior expectations.

This means

that people’s expectations at date t0 + 1 are the same as date t0 . The same logic applies at any date in
the future: as long as the observed value of unemployment is within expectations, then people keep their
7

previous period’s expectations.
If the unemployment rate is outside the range, though, the observation was a surprise to the residents
and forces them to update their expectations. We assume that at this point, people form their expectations
in a similar manner as at the initial date t0 , except now they use the most recent T periods as their
dataset. In this case,

s

and

s

would be calculated using [t0 + 1

T; t0 ] as data.5 For use later, de…ne

max _unempst (k) as the largest unemployment rate in the range of expectations for state s at time t
using k as the multiple. Similarly, let min _unempst (k) be the smallest unemployment rate in the range
of expectations for state s at time t using k as the multiple.
There are a few points we would like to make about de…ning expectations in this manner. First, there
might be many periods in a row in which expectations do not change. This would occur if the observed
unemployment rates remain su¢ ciently close to the past observations. Second, while expectations might
be static for long periods of time, they do change to re‡ect new information, as long as that information
is su¢ ciently unlike what has been observed in the past. Table 1 illustrates this point using data from
Colorado and k = 2. The rising unemployment rate in Colorado in late 2008 does not exceed expectations
until it rises above 6.367%, which occurs in January 2009. For the next nine months, the unemployment
rate remains outside of expectations. Meanwhile, expectations are adjusted to re‡ect the new information.
By October 2009, expectations catch up to the new, higher unemployment rate in Colorado. In words,
people adjust their expectations to incorporate a state’s higher unemployment rate, but that this process
takes time.
Third, if a state has witnessed a particularly volatile path of unemployment, expectations for that state
are relatively broad. This, intuitively, seems reasonable because historical data are less informative about
potential future unemployment rates.

Fourth, for larger values of k, the range of expectations grows.

This implies that it would take a more extreme observation of unemployment to induce migration. In our
empirical analysis, we test a variety of values of k to check the robustness of our results to this multiple.
To initialize our algorithm and so determine the path of unemployment expectations over time and by
state, we must make an assumption about T . This constant governs the number of previous periods that
people use to form and update their expectations.

A larger value of T would imply that people use a

larger window of past data to form their expectations of future unemployment. In the results presented
below, we assume that T = 120; that is, expectations are based on the past 120 months (or 10 years) of
data. We have also tested the robustness of this value and have found that our results are robust to both
8

a 5-year and a 20-year window.
With the state-speci…c paths of expectations in hand, we now form our two key independent variables.
These variables indicate whether the observed rate of unemployment in state s at time t was within
expectations and, if so, whether the observation was above or below the range. Let
8
< 1 if unemp
max _unempst (k)
st
f laghi_kst =
:
0 o/w
f laglo_kst

8
< 1 if unemp
min _unempst (k)
st
=
:
0 o/w

With these de…nitions, if the observed unemployment rate was within expectations, then f laghi_kst =
f laglo_kst = 0. However, if the unemployment rate was outside of the range of expectations, then either
f laghi_kst or f laglo_kst should equal one, depending on whether the observation was above or below the
range of expectations. To form the range and the two indicator variables, we have used unemployment data
from Bureau of Labor Statistics, which compiles them using data from the Current Population Survey.
This data tracks the unemployment rate by state and by month.
In addition to unemployment, we need data on net migration by state and by month. To obtain this,
we use monthly population data for each state from January 2000 to September 2010. These data are
created by the U.S. Census Bureau. With these values, we de…ne migration as the percent change in
population after mortality is removed. We use percent changes rather than the …rst di¤erences since our
geographic unit of observation (states) has a wide range of populations.
Upon examination of the data, we have decided to remove Louisiana and Mississippi from our dataset.
These two states are outliers in both the migration and unemployment data due to Hurricane Katrina.
Our results, though, are robust to this decision.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of our data, including the sample means of f laghi_kst and
f laglo_kst , for several values of k. For each value of k, we have a larger number of high unemployment
periods outside of expectations (i.e., f laghi_kst = 1) than low (i.e., f laglo_kst = 1). One explanation
could be that our sample time frame includes the most recent recession in which unemployment rose
quickly.
In our main empirical speci…cation, we estimate the following …xed e¤ects regression:
net_migrationst =

0

+

1

f laghi_ks;t

9

1

+

2

f laglo_ks;t

1

+

s

+

t

+

st

(3)

for several values of the multiple k.
and monthly dummy variables.

s

represents state-level …xed e¤ects, and

t

represents both yearly

Including these will help capture any state- or time-invariant e¤ects.

Note that we use the lag of the unemployment variables to allow people time to migrate in response to
changes in their unemployment expectations. Although we present our results using a one period lag, the
results are similar for two-period and three-period lags. For comparison to the extant migration literature,
we also run the same regression adding in the …rst di¤erence of unemployment, lagged one period, as
a covariate. All estimations use the heteroskedastic-consistent calculation of the standard errors. The
estimates on the …xed e¤ects are not presented below, but are available upon request, as are any of the
other claims made above.
If our theoretical model …nds support in the data, then we expect to …nd that the coe¢ cients on
the unemployment indicator variables are statistically signi…cant. Further, we expect that the coe¢ cient
on f laghi_ks;t

1

(f laglo_ks;t

1)

is negative (positive), as an unexpectedly large increase (decrease) in

unemployment would deter (spur) immigration.
In the top half of Table 3, we present the numerical results from our main speci…cation, assuming
di¤erent values of the multiple, k. As can be seen, we …nd that f laghi_ks;t

1

has the theoretically correct

sign and is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level across all di¤erent values of k. Also, the coe¢ cient on
f laglo_ks;t

1

is generally positive and signi…cant, consistent with the theory. The only time in which

the coe¢ cient on f laglo_ks;t

1

takes the opposite sign is when it is not statistically signi…cant at k = 2.

These results suggest that unexpectedly high observations of unemployment induce emigration from the
state, while unexpectedly low observations of unemployment encourage immigration into the state.
Next, we modify the baseline speci…cation to include

unemployments;t

1.

The results from these

regressions are presented in the bottom half of Table 3. Similar to the above …ndings, f laghi_ks;t

1

is

positive and statistically signi…cant at the 1% level across all values of k. Further, whenever f laglo_ks;t

1

is statistically signi…cant (which happens at k = 1 and k = 3), the coe¢ cient is positive, as predicted.
Finally, the coe¢ cient on the change in unemployment is negative and statistically signi…cant at the 10%
level in each speci…cation that includes this variable. This result runs counter to the simple theoretical
model presented above, which predicts that the observed level (or change) in the unemployment rate is
irrelevant to migration decisions, except insofar as it changes people’s expectations. One reason for this
divergence between the theory and the empirical results could be that we assumed that people expected
an independent and identically distributed unemployment shock in the theoretical model. If, instead,
10

people’s expectations have some history dependence, we would …nd that the observed unemployment rate
does in‡uence migration. We would like to highlight, though, that the …t of the change in unemployment
variable is generally worse than the f laghi_ks;t

1

and the f laglo_ks;t

1

variables and, as we will show,

has a considerably smaller economic impact. In addition, including the lagged change in unemployment
produces very small gains in overall explanatory power as measured by the r-squared.
To consider the economic impact of these estimates, consider a 0.1 percentage point increase in monthly
unemployment. If the new unemployment value is within people’s expectations, then (at k = 1) our
results suggest that the median state (with a population around 3.12 million) would lose 22 people in
the following month, an estimate that is statistically signi…cant at ten percent. If, instead, the new
unemployment value lies outside of people’s expectations, then the median state would lose 586 people, or
0.019% of its population. While these numbers are small percentages of the state’s population, note that
they re‡ect a monthly impact on population. Also, the average length of time an unemployment rate is
above expectations using k = 1 is 23.5 months. In other words, a median population state that spends the
average length of time above its expected unemployment range loses an estimated 13,771 people or 0.44%
of its population in just under two years.
Our estimates of the impact of an unexpectedly low unemployment shock on migration have a larger
variance across k.

The coe¢ cient is positive and statistically signi…cant for k = 1 and for k = 3, but

not signi…cant for k = 2. This may be driven by fewer observations of unexpectedly low unemployment
periods. The former type of shock induces an in-migration that is about one-quarter as large as the latter
type induces out-migration.
Exploring our numerical results further, we examine whether unemployment rates that are further
away from the range of expectations have a greater impact on net migration than do unemployment rates
that are close to, but still outside of, the range.

Intuitively, this could occur because unemployment

rates that are further away from the range of expectations cause larger changes in residents’expectations
than unemployment rates closer to the range. To test this, we alter our de…nitions of the unemployment
indicators to take into account the distance of the unemployment shock from people’s expectations. Let
8
< unempst s if unemp
max _unempst (k)
st
s
linearhi_kst =
:
0 o/w
8
< unempst s if unemp
min _unempst (k)
st
s
linearlo_kst =
:
0 o/w
11

where

s,

s,

max _unempst (k), and min _unempst (k) are de…ned as above. The variable linearhi_kst

captures not only whether the observed unemployment rate is above expectations, but also how far above
those expectations, where the distance is measured in standard deviations from the mean. The opposite
is true for linearlo_kst . With these new de…nitions, we regress net migration on the new unemployment
indicators, each lagged one period, using year, state, and month dummies. For completeness, we also run
the same regression adding in the change in unemployment, lagged one period.
As before, we predict that the coe¢ cient on linearhi_ks;t

1

is negative and the coe¢ cient on linearlo_ks;t

is positive. We also expect that an unemployment rate that is further away from expectations should have
a greater impact on migration than an unemployment rate closer to expectations.
Table 4 presents the results from this new regression.
…ndings and in line with our predictions.
linearhi_ks;t

1

The results are consistent with our previous

We …nd a negative and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient on

in every speci…cation. Also, all speci…cations have a positive and statistically signi…cant

coe¢ cient on linearlo_ks;t

1,

except when k = 2. One di¤erence from the previous results is that the

change in unemployment variable is no longer statistically signi…cant at k = 1.
Unsurprisingly, our point estimates are closer to zero than before. This reduction was expected because
we no longer average the impacts of all unexpected unemployment rates, but rather separate them based
on their distance from the mean. These point estimates suggest that, indeed, more extreme unexpected
unemployment shocks have greater e¤ects on migration than less extreme unexpected unemployment
shocks. To see the size of this di¤erence, consider a median population state whose unemployment rate
has jumped outside of expectations. If the unemployment rate is one standard deviation above the mean of
the range of expectations (using k = 1), then 273 people will migrate away from the state in the following
month. But, if the state’s unemployment rate is two standard deviations above, the state’s out-migration
will double.
Once again, the migration response for low, unexpected unemployment rates is more volatile relative to
high, unexpected unemployment rates. The amount of this di¤erence depends on the level of k. For k = 1,
unexpectedly low unemployment rates have about half the migration response compared to unexpectedly
high unemployment rates.

For k = 3, the migration response is larger for low, unexpected unemploy-

ment rates in absolute terms. More study is needed to examine this point, however, since we have few
observations of large, unexpected improvements in a state’s unemployment rate in our time frame.
We take the above results to be strong evidence that the role of expectations are central to under12

1

standing the impact of unemployment on net migration. In particular, unemployment observations that
are outside of expectations have a much greater impact on migration (by a factor of approximately 25)
than do observations within expectations.

Moreover, the further the observation is from the range of

expectations, the greater the impact on migration.
There is, though, a potential concern about the interpretation of our results.

Perhaps we are not

capturing how changes in expectations a¤ect net migration in our analysis, but rather we are capturing
the fact that large changes in unemployment drive migration. Under this alternative interpretation, our
expectations variable merely proxies for large unemployment changes.

To examine whether this is the

case, we construct a new set of unemployment indicator variables. Let

hi_kst

lo_kst

8
< 1 if
=
:

8
< 1 if
=
:

unempst

0:2 and f laghi_kst = 0
0 o/w

unempst

0:2 and f laglo_kst = 0
0 o/w

These variables isolate periods with large unemployment changes that do not trigger the ‡ag variables.
That is, these new variables collect the largest changes in unemployment (the unemployment change must
be greater than 0.2 in absolute value) in which the resulting unemployment rates are still within people’s
expectations.
Table 5 presents summary statistics for hi_kst and lo_kst . Of the 446 observations where

unempst

0:2, about 80% overlap with periods in which unemployment is above the expected range, using k = 1.
The amount of overlap drops as k increases because there are fewer periods outside of expectations by
de…nition. Finally, there is no overlap between periods where unemployment fell more than 0.2 percentage
points and the unemployment rate was below expectations. This second fact immediately o¤ers suggestive
evidence supporting our interpretation that changes in expectations drive net migration, not large changes
in unemployment.
With these variables, we regress net migration on hi_ks;t

1,

lo_ks;t

1,

and our state, year, and

month dummies. We also could include the f lag or linear variables, but we omit these results since
they do not substantially change our …ndings.

If our theoretical model is correct and expectations are

central to migration, we would expect that the coe¢ cients on hi_ks;t

1

and lo_ks;t

1,

to be statistically

indistinguishable from zero. Instead, if the alternative view is correct and migration depends only on large
13

changes in unemployment, then we expect that hi_ks;t

1

and lo_ks;t

1

will be statistically signi…cant

and have the right signs.
Table 6 presents our results from this regression. As can be seen, the coe¢ cients on hi_ks;t
lo_ks;t

1

1

and

are statistically indistinguishable from zero in every speci…cation. We believe that these results,

combined with Tables 3 and 4, provide substantial support for our interpretation that unemployment
expectations are central to understanding migration, while providing no evidence that large changes in
monthly unemployment drive migration. It is this latter point that strengthens our earlier assertion that
the previous literature’s regression of net migration on the observed values of unemployment led to model
misspeci…cation and hence, mixed results.

4

Conclusion

In this paper we develop a parsimonious theoretical model that shows that migration only occurs when
an unemployment rate causes expectations to change rather than occurring whenever the unemployment
rate changes. That is, only in periods where the observed unemployment rate is outside of expectations
is there a familiar linear e¤ect on migration.

Our empirical model veri…es this prediction. A change

in the monthly unemployment rate produces vastly di¤erent e¤ects on migration depending on whether
the new unemployment rate is within expectations or not. Using k = 1 and a median population state,
a 0.1 percentage point increase in the monthly unemployment rate corresponds to an out-migration of
22 people compared to 586 people if the shock pushes the new unemployment rate above expectations.
We also …nd in-migration for periods where the unemployment rate is unexpectedly low, though this
estimate ‡uctuates depending on the breadth of expectations. Finally, our robustness check veri…es that
our conclusions are not spurious due to the correlation between our de…nition of expectations and large
changes in unemployment.
Our …ndings provide a potential explanation for regions of persistent poverty, e.g. Appalachia or some
inner-cities, where out-migration occurs slower than expected. For residents of these areas, a high unemployment rate is likely within their expectations since it has occurred often in the past. As a consequence,
residents of Appalachia or these inner-cities don’t migrate out because the high unemployment rate didn’t
change their expectations.
We also believe that our approach to modeling and empirically measuring expectations could have a
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wide range of applications outside of the migration literature. For example, consider the random variable
associated with the growth rate in the average housing price in the U.S. Because that random variable
was consistently positive prior to 2008, many investors and regulators behaved as if it could not become
negative. This state of the world was outside of their expectations. Only after the random variable was
observed to be negative and investors were forced to update their expectations did their behavior change.
There remains some ambiguity about our model of expectations. Speci…cally, how do consumers
transform information into expectations for the future? For example, how far back in the past do they use
information (that is, what is the true value of T )? How wide are their expectations (k)? Do they update
expectations each period or only when shocks are outside of expectations? Fortunately, our estimates are
largely robust across these questions, but we believe that understanding the formation of expectations is
the next step in specifying the relationship between unemployment and migration.
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Notes
1 We

do not claim that this is the only de…nition of shocks that are outside or within expectations. Instead, our assumed

de…nition is merely one of many possible de…nitions. As such, our empirical results should be viewed as supportive but not
conclusive evidence on the implications of our theoretical model.
2 Although

this model is written without explicit reference to time, we implicitly assume that all workers living in a

region have an equal probability of being employed in the following period, where that probability is equal to one minus the
unemployment rate.
3 Our

assumption that residents believe that the regions’unemployment rate draws are i.i.d. is not innocuous. We could

have, instead, assumed that there was some history dependence in people’s expectations (the shock could be characterized
by a random walk process, for example). This alternative assumption would imply that all unemployment observations alter
people’s expectations.

While we do not reject this as a possibility, the goal of our theoretical model is to show that only

unemployment observations that change people’s expectations cause migration. As such, we needed a process in which some
observations change people’s expectations while others do not.
4 To

be more precise, we have unemployment data by month and by state from 1990-2010 and net migration data by month

and by state from 2000-2010. We use the pre-2000 unemployment data to create our measure of the initial expectations of
the state’s unemployment rates for the year 2000. Then, with the algorithm detailed below, we use the unemployment data
to update expectations and to determine which unemployment observations are within those expectations and which are
outside. With this information, we test that prediction of our theoretical model that only shocks that change expectations
a¤ect net migration.
5 As

a robustness check, we considered an alternative approach to forming people’s unemployment expectations. In that

approach, we assumed that people updated their expectations each period using a rolling window of past unemployment
observations, regardless of whether the unemployment observation was outside or inside expectations.

This alternative

approach yielded qualitatively similar results to the model we currently present. The results from that alternative approach
are available on request from the authors.
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Table 1: Expectations Definition Example: Colorado
year

µst

σst

Sep 2008
Oct 2008
Nov 2008
Dec 2008
Jan 2009
Feb 2009
Mar 2009
Apr 2009
May2009
Jun 2009
Jul 2009
Aug 2009
Sep 2009
Oct 2009
Nov 2009
Dec 2009

4.431
4.431
4.431
4.431
4.539
4.571
4.606
4.648
4.690
4.732
4.774
4.814
4.853
4.853
4.853
4.853

0.968
0.968
0.968
0.968
1.139
1.146
1.162
1.186
1.218
1.252
1.287
1.316
1.338
1.338
1.338
1.338

lower
bound
2.495
2.495
2.495
2.495
2.261
2.279
2.282
2.276
2.254
2.228
2.200
2.182
2.177
2.177
2.177
2.177

upper
bound
6.367
6.367
6.367
6.367
6.816
6.862
6.932
7.019
7.127
7.237
7.349
7.446
7.529
7.529
7.529
7.529

unemp.
rate
5.1
5.4
5.7
6.2
6.7
7.3
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.1
7.9
7.7
7.5
7.4
7.3

outside
of exp.?
no
no
no
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no

Note: This example uses k = 2. The formula for the range of expectations is µst ±
2σst. To determine whether an unemployment rate is outside the range of
expectations, it is compared against the previous month’s upper and lower
bounds.

Table 2: Summary Statistics
mean
(standard deviation)
0.092
(0.006)
0.036
(0.139)
frequency

percent

outside high
outside low
k=2

1,676
1,338

26.51%
21.17%

outside high
outside low
k=3

840
202

13.29%
3.20%

outside high
outside low

354
34

5.60%
0.54%

population growth rate
∆ unemployment rate
k=1

Note: There are 6,321 state-month observations.

Table 3: Estimation – Intercept Effect
(p-values in parentheses)
k=1

k=2

k=3

-0.01854
(<0.001)
0.00632
(0.001)
0.6848

-0.01709
(<0.001)
-0.0029
(0.491)
0.6815

-0.01817
(<0.001)
0.0208
(0.043)
0.6815

-0.00702
(0.088)
-0.01816
(<0.001)
0.00597
(0.003)
0.6850

-0.01331
(0.001)
-0.01683
(<0.001)
-0.00356
(0.395)
0.6821

-0.01044
(0.009)
-0.01748
(<0.001)
0.02021
(0.050)
0.6819

estimation without
∆ unemployment

flaghi _ ks,t−1
flaglo _ ks,t−1
r-squared
estimation with
∆ unemployment
∆ unemployment t-1

flaghi _ ks,t−1
flaglo _ ks,t−1
r-squared

Note: These estimations also include year dummies, month dummies, and statelevel fixed effects.

Table 4: Estimation – Linear Effect
(p-values in parentheses)
k=1

k=2

k=3

-0.00875
(<0.001)
0.00452
(0.001)
0.6869

-0.00564
(<0.001)
-0.00040
(0.829)
0.6818

-0.00526
(<0.001)
0.00829
(0.016)
0.6819

-0.00157
(0.699)
-0.00869
(<0.001)
0.00446
(0.001)
0.6869

-0.01141
(0.004)
-0.00548
(<0.001)
-0.00064
(0.732)
0.6822

-0.01001
(0.012)
-0.0051
(<0.001)
0.00812
(0.018)
0.6823

estimation without
∆ unemployment

linearhi _ ks,t−1
linearlo _ ks,t−1
r-squared
estimation with
∆ unemployment
∆ unemploymentt-1

linearhi _ ks,t−1
linearlo _ ks,t−1
r-squared

Note: These estimations also include year dummies, month dummies, and statelevel fixed effects.

Table 5: Robustness Check – Summary Statistics

∆ unemployment > 0.2
∆ unemployment < -0.2
Overlap
k=1
k=2
k=3

frequency
446
41
unemployment above
expectations
357
(80.04%)
191
(42.83%)
114
(25.26%)

unemployment below
expectations
0
0
0

Note: Overlap refers to the number of observations where ∆ unemployment > 0.2
and the unemployment rate is outside of expectations for a given value of k. The
percentages refer to the percent overlap and are taken out of 446.

Table 6: Robustness Check – Estimation
(p-values in parentheses)
k=1

k=2

k=3

-0.00068
(0.861)
0.00049
(0.933)
0.6800

-0.00346
(0.158)
0.00048
(0.935)
0.6801

-0.00339
(0.128)
0.00043
(0.942)
0.6801

-0.01610
(<0.001)
0.00268
(0.501)
-0.00590
(0.333)
0.6807

-0.01550
(0.001)
0.00006
(0.982)
-0.00568
(0.353)
0.6807

-0.01602
(0.001)
0.00064
(0.779)
-0.00587
(0.339)
0.6807

estimation without
∆ unemployment

hi _ ks,t−1
lo _ ks,t−1
r-squared
estimation with
∆ unemployment
∆ unemployment

hi _ ks,t−1
lo _ ks,t−1
r-squared

Note: These estimations also include year dummies, month dummies, and statelevel fixed effects.

